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Abstract
Deception plays a critical role in the financial industry, online mar-
kets, national defense, and countless other areas. Understanding and
harnessing deception - especially in cyberspace - is both crucial and
difficult. Recent work in this area has used game theory to study the
roles of incentives and rational behavior. Building upon this work,
we employ a game-theoretic model for the purpose of mechanism de-
sign. Specifically, we study a defensive use of deception: implementa-
tion of honeypots for network defense. How does the design problem
change when an adversary develops the ability to detect honeypots?
We analyze two models: cheap-talk games and an augmented version
of those games that we call cheap-talk games with evidence, in which
the receiver can detect deception with some probability. Our first
contribution is this new model for deceptive interactions. We show
that the model includes traditional signaling games and complete in-
formation games as special cases. We also demonstrate numerically
that deception detection sometimes eliminate pure-strategy equilibria.
Finally, we present the surprising result that the utility of a decep-
tive defender can sometimes increase when an adversary develops the
ability to detect deception. These results apply concretely to network
defense. They are also general enough for the large and critical body
of strategic interactions that involve deception.
Key words: deception, anti-deception, cyber security, mechanism
design, signaling game, game theory
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1 Introduction
Deception has always garnered attention in popular culture, from the decep-
tion that planted a seed of anguish in Shakespeare’s Macbeth to the deception
that drew viewers to the more contemporary television series Lie to Me. Our
human experience seems to be permeated by deception, which may even be
engrained into human beings via evolutionary factors [1, 2]. Yet humans are
famously bad at detecting deception [3, 4]. An impressive body of research
aims to improve these rates, especially in interpersonal situations. Many in-
vestigations involve leading subjects to experience an event or recall a piece
of information and then asking them to lie about it [5, 3, 6]. Researchers
have shown that some techniques can aid in detecting lies - such as asking
a suspect to recall events in reverse order [3], asking her to maintain eye
contact [6], asking unexpected questions or strategically using evidence [7].
Clearly, detecting interpersonal deception is still an active area of research.
While understanding interpersonal deception is difficult, studying decep-
tion in cyberspace has its set of unique challenges. In cyberspace, information
can lack permanence, typical cues to deception found in physical space can
be missing, and it can be difficult to impute responsibility [8]. Consider, for
example, the problem of identifying deceptive opinion spam in online mar-
kets. Deceptive opinion spam consists of comments made about products or
services by actors posing as customers, when they are actually representing
the interests of the company concerned or its competitors. The research chal-
lenge is to separate comments made by genuine customers from those made
by self-interested actors posing as customers. This is difficult for humans to
do unaided; two out of three human judges in [9] failed to perform signifi-
cantly better than chance. To solve this problem, the authors of [9] make
use of approaches including a tool called the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count,
an approach based on the frequency distribution of part-of-speech tags, and
third approach which uses a classification based on n-grams. This highlights
(quanyan.zhu@nyu.edu), Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Polytech-
nic School of Engineering of NYU, 5 MetroTech Center 200A, Brooklyn, NY 11201
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the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to studying deception, espe-
cially in cyberspace.
Although an interdisciplinary approach to studying deception offers im-
portant insights, the challenge remains of putting it to work in a quantitative
framework. In behavioral deception experiments, for instance, the incentives
to lie are also often poorly controlled, in the sense that subjects may sim-
ply be instructed to lie or to tell the truth [10]. This prohibits a natural
setting in which subjects could make free choices. These studies also can-
not make precise mathematical predictions about the effect of deception or
deception-detecting techniques [10]. Understanding deception in a quantita-
tive framework could help to give results rigor and predictability.
To achieve this rigor and predictability, we analyze deception through
the framework of game theory. This framework allows making quantita-
tive, verifiable predictions, and enables the study of situations involving free
choice (the option to deceive or not to deceive) and well-defined incentives
[10]. Specifically, the area of incomplete information games allows modeling
the information asymmetry that forms part and parcel of deception. In a
signaling game, a receiver observes a piece of private information and com-
municates a message to a receiver, who chooses an action. The receiver’s best
action depends on his belief about the private information of the sender. But
the sender may use strategies in which he conveys or does not convey this
private information. It is natural to make connections between the signaling
game terminology of pooling, separating, and partially-separating equilibria
and deceptive, truthful, and partially-truthful behavior. Thus, game theory
provides a suitable framework for studying deception.
Beyond analyzing equilibria, we also want to design solutions that control
the environment in which deception takes place. This calls for the reverse
game theory perspective of mechanism design. In mechanism design, exoge-
nous factors are manipulated in order to design the outcome of a game. In
signaling games, these solutions might seek to obtain target utilities or a
desired level of information communication. If the deceiver in the signaling
game has the role of an adversary - for problems in security or privacy, for
example - a defender often wants to design methods to limit the amount of
deception. But defenders may also use deception to their advantage. In this
case, it is the adversary who may try to implement mechanisms to mitigate
the effects of the deception. A more general mechanism design perspective for
signaling games could consider other ways of manipulating the environment,
such as feedback and observation (Fig. 1.1).
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Figure 1.1: A general framework for mechanism design. Manipulating the
environment in which deception takes place in a signaling game could include
adding additional blocks as well as manipulating exogenous parameters of
the game. In general, type m can be manipulated by input from a controller
before reaching the sender. The controller can rely on an observer to estimate
unknown states. In this paper, we specifically study the roll of a detector,
which compares type to message and emits evidence for deception.
In this paper, we study deception in two different frameworks. The first
framework is a typical game of costless communication between a sender and
receiver known as cheap-talk. In the second framework, we add the element of
deception detection, forming a game of cheap-talk with evidence. This latter
model includes a move by nature after the action of the sender, which yields
evidence for deception with some probability. In order provide a concrete
example, we consider a specific use of deception for defense, and the employ-
ment of antideceptive techniques by an attacker. In this scenario, a defender
uses honeypots disguised as normal systems to protect a network, and an
adversary implements honeypot detection in order to strike back against this
deception. We give an example of how an adversary might obtain evidence
for deception through a timing classification known as fuzzy benchmarking.
Finally, we show how network defenders need to bolster their capabilities in
order to maintain the same results in the face of honeypot detection. This
mechanism design approach reverses the mappings from adversary power to
evidence detection and evidence detection to game outcome. Although we
apply it to a specific research problem, our approach is quite general and
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can be used in deceptive interactions in both interpersonal deception and
deception in cyber security. Our main contributions include 1) developing
a model for signaling games with deception detection, and analyzing how
this model includes traditional signaling games and complete information
games as special cases, 2) demonstrating that the ability to detect deception
causes pure strategy equilibria to disappear under certain conditions, and 3)
showing that deception detection by an adversary could actually increase the
utility obtained by a network defender. These results have specific implica-
tions for network defense through honeypot deployment, but can be applied
to a large class of strategic interactions involving deception in both physical
and cyberspace.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews cheap-talk
signaling games and the solution concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium. We use this framework to analyze the honeypot scenario in Section 3.
Section 4 adds the element of deception detection to the signaling game. We
describe an example of how this detection might be implemented in Section
5. Then we analyze the resulting game in section 6. In Section 7, we discuss
a case study in which a network defender needs to change in order to respond
to the advent of honeypot detection. We review related work in Section 8,
and conclude the paper in Section 9.
2 Cheap-Talk Signaling Games
In this section, we review the concept of signaling games, a class of two-player,
dynamic, incomplete information games. The information asymmetry and
dynamic nature of these games captures the essence of deception, and the
notion of separating, pooling, or partially-separating equilibria can be related
to truthful, deceptive, or partially-truthful behavior.
2.1 Game Model
Our model consists of a signaling game in which the types, messages, and
actions are taken from discrete sets with two elements. Call this two-player,
incomplete information game G. In G, a sender, S, observes a type m ∈
M = {0, 1} drawn with probabilities p (0) and p (1) = 1 − p (0). He then
sends a message, n ∈ N = {0, 1} to the receiver, R. After observing the
message (but not the type), R plays an action y ∈ Y = {0, 1} . The flow
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Figure 2.1: Block diagram of a signaling game with two discrete types, mes-
sages, and actions.
of information between sender and receiver is depicted in Fig. 2.1. Let
uS (y,m) and uR (y,m) be the utility obtained by S and R, respectively,
when the type is m and the receiver plays action y. Notice that the utilities
are not directly dependent on the message, n; hence the description of this
model as a “cheap-talk” game.
The sender’s strategy consists of playing a message n, after observing
a type m, with probability σS (n |m). The receiver’s strategy consists of
playing an action y, after observing a message n, with probability σR (y |n).
Denote the sets of all such strategies as ΓS, and ΓR. Define expected utilities
for the sender and receiver as US : ΓS × ΓR → R and UR : ΓS × ΓR → R,
such that US (σS, σR) and UR (σS, σR) are the expected utilities for the sender
and receiver, respectively, when the sender and receiver play according to
the strategy profile (σS, σR). Finally, define U˜S : ΓS × ΓR ×M → R and
U˜R : ΓR ×M × N → R such that U˜S (σS, σR,m) gives the expected utility
for S for playing σS when R plays σR and the type is m, and U˜R (σR,m, n)
gives the expected utility for R for playing σR when the type is m and she
observes message n.
2.2 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We now review the concept of Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the natural
extension of subgame perfection to games of incomplete information.
A Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see [11]) of signaling game G is a
strategy profile (σS, σR) and posterior beliefs µR(m |n) of the receiver about
the sender such that
∀m ∈M, σS ∈ arg max
σ¯S∈ΓS
U˜S (σ¯S, σR,m) , (2.1)
∀n ∈ N, σR ∈ arg max
σ¯R∈ΓR
∑
m¯∈M
µR (m¯ |n) U˜R (σ¯R, m¯, n) , (2.2)
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µR (m |n) =

σS(n |m)p(m)∑
m¯∈M
σS(n | m¯)p(m¯) , if
∑
m¯∈M
σS (n | m¯) p (m¯) > 0
any distrubution on M, if
∑
m¯∈M
σS (n | m¯) p (m¯) = 0
. (2.3)
Eq. 2.1 requires S to maximize his expected utility for the strategy played
by R for all types m. The second equation requires that, for all messages
n, R maximizes his expected utility against the strategy played by S given
his beliefs. Finally, Eq. 2.3 requires the beliefs of R about the type to be
consistent with the strategy played by S, using Bayes’ Law to update his
prior belief according to S’s strategy.
3 Analysis of Deceptive Conflict Using Signal-
ing Games
In this section, we describe an example of deception in cyber security using
signaling games. These type of models have been used, for instance, in
[12, 13, 14, 15]. We give results here primarily in order to show how the
results change after we add the factor of evidence emission in Section 6.
Consider a game Ghoney, in which a defender uses honeypots to protect a
network of computers. We consider a model and parameters from [12], with
some adaptations. In this game, the ratio of normal systems to honeypots is
considered fixed. Based on this ratio, nature assigns a type - normal system
or honeypot - to each system in the network. The sender is the network
defender, who can choose to reveal the type of each system or disguise the
systems. He can disguise honeypots as normal systems and disguise normal
systems as honeypots. The message is thus the network defender’s portrayal
of the system. The receiver in this game is the attacker, who observes the
defender’s portrayal of the system but not the actual type of the system.
He forms a belief about the actual type of the system given the sender’s
message, and then chooses an action: attack or withdraw2. Table 1 gives the
parameters of Ghoney, and the extensive form of Ghoney is given in Fig. 3.1.
2In the model description in [12], the attacker also has an option to condition his attack
on testing the system. We omit this option, because we will consider the option to test
the system through a different approach in the signaling game with evidence emission in
Section 6.
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Table 1: Parameters of Ghoney. M.S. signifies Mixed Strategy
Parameter Symbol Meaning
S Network defender
R Network attacker
m ∈ {0, 1} Type of system (0: normal; 1: honeypot)
n ∈ {0, 1} Defender description of system (0: normal; 1: honeypot)
y ∈ {0, 1} Attacker action (0: withdraw; 1: attack)
p(m) Prior probability of type m
σS (n |m) Sender MS prob. of describing type m as n
σR (y |n) Receiver MS prob. of action y given description n
vo Defender benefit of observing attack on honeypot
vg Defender benefit of avoiding attack on normal system
−cc Defender cost of normal system being compromised
va Attacker benefit of comprimizing normal system
−ca Attacker cost of attack on any type of system
−co Attacker additional cost of attacking honeypot
We have used the game theory software Gambit [16] for this illustration, as
well as for simulating the results of games later in the paper.
In order to characterize the equilibria of Ghoney, define two constants: CBR0
and CBS1 . Let CBR0 give the relative benefit to R for playing attack (y = 1)
compared to playing withdraw (y = 0) when the system is a normal system
(m = 0), and let CBR1 give the relative benefit to R for playing withdraw
compared to playing attack when the system is a honeypot (m = 1). These
constants are defined by Eq. 3.1 and Eq. 3.2.
CBR0 , uR (1, 0)− uR (0, 0) (3.1)
CBR1 , uR (0, 1)− uR (1, 1) (3.2)
We now find the pure-strategy separating and pooling equilibria of Ghoney.
Theorem 1. The equilibria of Ghoney differ in form in three parameter re-
gions:
• Attack-favorable: p (0) CBR0 > (1− p (0)) CBR1
• Defend-favorable: p (0) CBR0 < (1− p (0)) CBR1
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Figure 3.1: Extensive form of Ghoney, a game in which defender S chooses
whether to disguise systems in a network of computers, and an attacker R
attempts to gain from compromising normal systems but withdrawing from
honeypots. Note that the type m is determined by a chance move.
• Neither-favorable: p (0) CBR0 = (1− p (0)) CBR1
In attack-favorable, p (0) CBR0 > (1− p (0)) CBR1 , meaning loosely that the
relative benefit to the receiver for attacking normal systems is greater than
the relative loss to the receiver for attacking honeypots. In defend-favorable,
p (0) CBR0 < (1− p (0)) CBR1 , meaning that the relative loss for attacking
honeypots is greater than the relative benefit from attacking normal systems.
In neither-favorable, p (0) CBR0 = (1− p (0)) CBR1 . We omit analysis of the
neither-favorable region because it only arises with exact equality in the game
parameters.
3.1 Separating Equilibria
In separating equilibria, the sender plays different pure strategies for each
type that he observes. Thus, he completely reveals the truth. The attacker
R in Ghoney wants to attack normal systems but withdraw from honeypots.
The defender S wants the opposite: that the attacker attack honeypots and
withdraw from normal systems. Thus, Theorem 2 should come as no surprise.
Theorem 2. No separating equilibria exist in Ghoney.
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3.2 Pooling Equilibria
In pooling equilibria, the sender plays the same strategies for each type.
This is deceptive behavior because the sender’s messages do not convey the
type that he observes. The receiver relies only on prior beliefs about the
distribution of types in order to choose his action. Theorem 3 gives the
pooling equilibria of Ghoney in the attack-favorable region.
Theorem 3. Ghoney supports the following pure strategy pooling equilibria in
the attack-favorable parameter region:
∀m ∈M, σS (1 |m) = 1, (3.3)
∀n ∈ N, σR (1 |n) = 1, (3.4)
µR (1 | 0) ≤ CB
R
0
CBR0 + CBR1
; µR (1 | 1) = p (1) , (3.5)
and
∀m ∈M, σS (1 |m) = 0, (3.6)
∀n ∈ N, σR (1 |n) = 1, (3.7)
µR (1 | 0) = p (1) ; µR (1 | 1) ≤ CB
R
0
CBR0 + CBR1
, (3.8)
both with expected utilities given by
US (σS, σR) = u
S (1, 1)− p (0) (uS (1, 1)− uS (1, 0)) , (3.9)
UR (σS, σR) = u
R (1, 1)− p (0) (uR (1, 1)− uR (1, 0)) . (3.10)
Similarly, Theorem 4 gives the pooling equilibria of Ghoney in the defend-
favorable region.
Theorem 4. Ghoney supports the following pure strategy pooling equilibria in
the defend-favorable parameter region:
∀m ∈M, σS (1 |m) = 1, (3.11)
∀n ∈ N, σR (1 |n) = 0, (3.12)
µR (1 | 0) ≥ CB
R
0
CBR0 + CBR1
; µR (1 | 1) = p (1) , (3.13)
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and
∀m ∈M, σS (1 |m) = 0, (3.14)
∀n ∈ N, σR (1 |n) = 0, (3.15)
µR (1 | 0) = p (1) ; µR (1 | 1) ≥ CB
R
0
CBR0 + CBR1
, (3.16)
both with expected utilities given by
US (σS, σR) = p (0)
(
uS (0, 0)− uS (0, 1))+ uS (0, 1) , (3.17)
UR (σS, σR) = p (0)
(
uR (0, 0)− uR (0, 1))+ uR (0, 1) . (3.18)
In both cases, it is irrelevant whether the defender always sends 1 or
always sends 0 (always describes systems as honeypots or always describes
systems as normal systems); the effect is that the attacker ignores the de-
scription. In the attack-favorable region, the attacker always attacks. In the
defend-favorable region, the attacker always withdraws.
3.3 Discussion of Ghoney Equilibria
We will discuss these equilibria more when we compare them with the equi-
libria of the game with evidence emission. Still, we note one aspect of the
equilibria here. At p (0) CBR0 = (1− p (0)) CBR1 , the expected utility is con-
tinuous for the receiver, but not for the sender. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the
sender’s (network defender’s) utility sharply improves if he transitions from
having p (0) CBR0 > (1− p (0)) CBR1 to p (0) CBR0 < (1− p (0)) CBR1 , i.e. from
having 40% honeypots to having 41% honeypots. This is an obvious mech-
anism design consideration. We will analyze this case further in the section
on mechanism design.
4 Cheap-Talk Signaling Games with Evidence
In Section 3, we used a typical signaling game to model deception in cy-
berspace (in Ghoney). In this section, we add to this game the possibility that
the sender gives away evidence of deception.
In a standard signaling game, the receiver’s belief about the type is based
only on the messages that the sender communicates and his prior belief.
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Figure 3.2: Expected Utilities verses Fraction of Normal Systems in Network.
In many deceptive interactions, however, there is some probability that the
sender gives off evidence of deceptive behavior. In this case, the receiver’s
beliefs about the sender’s private information may be updated both based
upon the message of the sender and by evidence of deception.
4.1 Game Model
Let Gevidence denote a signaling game with belief updating based both on
sender message and on evidence of deception. This game consists of four
steps, in which step 3 is new:
1. Sender, S, observes type, m ∈M = {0, 1}.
2. S communicates a message, n ∈ N = {0, 1}, chosen according to a
strategy σS (n |m) ∈ ΓS = ∆N based on the type m that he observes.
3. S emits evidence, e ∈ E = {0, 1} with probability λ (e |m,n). Signal
e = 1 represents evidence of deception and e = 0 represents no evidence
of deception.
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Figure 4.1: Block diagram of a signaling game with evidence emission.
4. Receiver R responds with an action, y ∈ Y = {0, 1}, chosen according
to a strategy σR (y |n, e) ∈ ΓR = ∆Y based on the message n that he
receives and evidence e that he observes.
5. S, R receive uS (y,m), uR (y,m).
Evidence e is another signal that is available to R, in addition to the message
n. This signal could come, e.g., from a detector, which generates evidence
with a probability that is a function ofm and n. The detector implements the
function λ (e |m,n). We depict this view of the signaling game with evidence
emission in Fig. 4.1. We assume that λ (e |m,n) is common knowledge to
both the sender and receiver. Since evidence is emitted with some probability,
we model this as a move by a “chance” player, just as we model the random
selection of the type at the beginning of the game as a move by a chance
player. The outcome of the new chance move will be used by R together
with his observation of S’s action to formulate his belief about the type m.
We describe this belief updating in the next section.
4.2 Two-step Bayesian Updating
Bayesian updating is a two-step process, in which the receiver first updates
his belief about the type based on the observed message of the sender, and
then updates his belief a second time based on the evidence emitted. The
following steps formulate the update process.
1. R observes S’s action. He computes belief µR (m |n) based on the prior
likelihoods p (m) of each type and S’s message n according to Eq. 2.3,
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which we rewrite here in Eq. 4.1.
µR (m |n) =

σS(n |m)p(m)∑
m¯∈M
σS(n | m¯)p(m¯) , if
∑
m¯∈M
σS (n | m¯) p (m¯) > 0
any distribution on M, if
∑
m¯∈M
σS (n | m¯) p (m¯) = 0
(4.1)
2. S computes a new belief based on the evidence emitted. The prior
belief in this second step is given by µR (m |n) obtained in the first
step. The conditional probability of emitting evidence e when the type
is m and the sender communicates message n is λ (e |m,n). Thus, the
receiver updates his belief in this second step according to
µR (m |n, e) =

λ(e |m,n)µR(m |n)∑
m¯∈M
λ(e | m¯,n)µR(m¯ |n) , if
∑
m¯∈M
λ (e | m¯, n)µR (m¯ |n) > 0
any distribution on M, if
∑
m¯∈M
λ (e | m¯, n)µR (m¯ |n) = 0
.
(4.2)
Having formulated the belief updating rules, we now give the conditions for
a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in our signaling game with evidence
emission.
4.3 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Signaling Game
with Evidence
The conditions for a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of our augmented
game are the same as those for the original signaling game, except that the
belief update includes the use of emitted evidence. Here, however, we must
also define a new utility function for R that takes expectation conditional
upon e in addition to n. Define this utility function by UˆR : ΓR ×M ×N ×
E → R such that UˆR (σR,m, n, e) gives the expected utility for R for playing
σR when the type is m and she observes message n and evidence e.
Definition 1. A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Gevidence is
a strategy profile (σS, σR) and posterior beliefs µR(m |n, e), such that system
given by Eq. 4.3 through Eq. 4.6 are simultaneously satisfied.
∀m ∈M, σS ∈ arg max
σ¯S∈ΓS
U˜S (σ¯S, σR,m) (4.3)
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∀n ∈ N, ∀e ∈ E, σR ∈ arg max
σ¯R∈ΓR
∑
m¯∈M
µR(m¯ |n, e)UˆR (σ¯R, m¯, n, e) (4.4)
∀n ∈ N, µR (m |n) =

σS(n |m)p(m)∑
m¯∈M
σS(n | m¯)p(m¯) , if
∑
m¯∈M
σS (n | m¯) p (m¯) > 0
any distribution on M, if
∑
m¯∈M
σS (n | m¯) p (m¯) = 0
(4.5)
∀n ∈ N, ∀e ∈ E,
µR (m |n, e) =

λ(e |m,n)µR(m |n)∑
m¯∈M
λ(e | m¯,n)µR(m¯ |n) , if
∑
m¯∈M
λ (e | m¯, n)µR (m¯ |n) > 0
any distribution on M, if
∑
m¯∈M
λ (e | m¯, n)µR (m¯ |n) = 0
(4.6)
Again, the first two definitions require the sender and receiver to maxi-
mize their expected utilities. The third and fourth equations require belief
consistency in terms of Bayes’ Law.
5 Deception Detection Example in Network De-
fense
Consider again our example of deception in cyberspace in which a defender
protects a network of computer systems using honeypots. The defender has
the ability to disguise normal systems as honeypots and honeypots as normal
systems. In Section 3, we modeled this deception as if it were possible for
the defender to disguise the systems without any evidence of deception. In
reality, attackers may try to detect honeypots. For example, send-safe.com’s
“Honeypot Hunter” [17] checks lists of HTTPS and SOCKS proxies and out-
puts text files of valid proxies, failed proxies, and honeypots. It performs a
set of tests which include opening a false mail server on the local system to
test the proxy connection, connecting to the proxy port, and attempting to
proxy back to its false mail server [18].
Another approach to detecting honeypots is based on timing. [19] used a
process termed fuzzy benchmarking in order to classify systems as real ma-
chines or virtual machines, which could be used e.g., as honeypots. In this
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process, the authors run a set of instructions which yield different timing
results on different host hardware architectures in order to learn more about
the hardware of the host system. Then, they run a loop of control modifying
CPU instructions (read and write control register 3, which induces a trans-
lation lookaside buffer flush) that results in increased run-time on a virtual
machine compared to a real machine. The degree to which the run-times
are different between the real and virtual machines depends on the number
of sensitive instructions in the loop. The goal is to run enough sensitive
instructions to make the divergence in run-time - even in the presence of
internet noise - large enough to reliably classify the system using a timing
threshold. They do not identify limits to the number of sensitive instructions
to run, but we can imagine that the honeypot detector might itself want to
go undetected by the honeypot and so might want to limit the number of
instructions.
Although they do not recount the statistical details, such an approach
could result in a classification problem which can only be accomplished suc-
cessfully with some probability. In Fig. 5.1, t represents the execution time
of the fuzzy benchmarking code. The curve f0 (t) represents the probability
density function for execution time for normal systems (m = 0), and the
curve f1 (t) represents the probability density function for execution time for
virtual machines (m = 1). The execution time td represents a threshold time
used to classify the system under test. Let ARi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the
area under regions R1 through R4. We have defined λ (e |m,n) to be the
likelihood with which a system of type m represented as a system as type n
gives off evidence for deception e (where e = 1 represents evidence for de-
ception and e = 0 represents evidence for truth-telling). A virtual machine
disguised as a normal system may give off evidence for deception, in this case
in terms of the run-time of fuzzy benchmarking code. We would then have
that
λ (1 | 1, 0) = AR3 + AR4
λ (0 | 1, 0) = AR2 = 1− (AR3 + AR4) . (5.1)
If the system under test were actually a normal system, then the same
test could result in some likelihood of a false-positive result for deception.
Then, we would have
λ (1 | 0, 0) = AR3
λ (0 | 0, 0) = AR1 + AR2 = 1− (AR3) . (5.2)
16
Figure 5.1: Classification of systems as normal or virtual (e.g. a honeypot)
based on run-time for a set of control modifying CPU instructions (based on
fuzzy benchmarking in [19]).
Let us assume that the likelihood with which one type of system mas-
querading as another can be successfully detected is the same regardless of
whether it is a honeypot that is disguised as a normal system or it is a normal
system that is disguised as a honeypot. Denote this probability as  ∈ [0, 1].
Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be defined as the likelihood of falsely detecting deception3.
These probabilities are given by
 = λ (1 |m,n) , m 6= n, (5.3)
δ = λ (1 |m,n) m = n. (5.4)
In [19], the authors tune the number of instructions for the CPU to run in
order to sufficiently differentiate normal systems and honeypots. In this case,
 and δ may relate to the number of instructions that the detector asks the
CPU to run. In general, though, the factors which influence  and δ could
vary. Powerful attackers will have relatively high  and low δ compared to
less powerful attackers. Next, we study this network defense example using
our model of signaling games with evidence.
3Note that we assume that  and δ are common knowledge; the defender also knows
the power of the adversary.
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Figure 6.1: Extensive form depiction of Gevidencehoney . Note that the type m and
the evidence e are both determined by chance moves.
6 Analysis of Network Defense using Signaling
Games with Evidence
Figure 6.1 depicts an extensive-form of the signaling game with evidence for
our network defense problem. Call this game Gevidencehoney . (See [12] for a more
detailed explanation of the meaning of the parameters.) In the extremes of
 and δ, we will see that the game degenerates into simpler types of games.
First, because R updates his belief based on evidence emission in a
Bayesian manner, any situation in which δ =  will render the evidence
useless. The condition δ =  would arise from an attacker completely pow-
erless to detect deception. This is indicated in Fig. 6.2 by the region game
without evidence, which we term RWeak to indicate an attacker with weak
detection capability.
Second, on the other extreme, we have the condition  = 1, δ = 0, which
indicates that the attacker can always detect deception and never registers
false positives. Denote this region ROmnipotent to indicate an attacker with
omnipotent detection capability. ROmnipotent degenerates into a complete
18
Figure 6.2: Degenerate cases of Gevidencehoney
information game in which both S and R are able to observe the type m.
Third, we have a condition in which the attacker’s detection capability is
such that evidence guarantees deception (when δ = 0 but  is not necessarily
1) and a condition in which the attacker’s power is such that no evidence
guarantees truth-telling (when  = 1 but δ is not necessarily 0). We can term
these two regions RConservative and RAggressive, because the attacker never
detects a false positive in RConservative and never misses a sign for deception
in RAggressive.
Finally, we have the region RIntermediate in which the attacker’s detection
capability is powerful enough that he correctly detects deception with greater
rate than he registers false positives, but does not achieve δ = 0 or  = 1.
We list these attacker conditions in Table 24. Let us examine the equilibria
of Gevidencehoney in these different cases.
4We have defined these degenerate cases only for the case in which  ≥ δ - i.e., evidence
for deception is more likely to be emitted when the sender lies then when he tells the truth.
Mathematically, the equilibria of the game are actually symmetric around the diagonal
 = δ in Fig. 6.2. This can be explained intuitively by considering the evidence emitted
to be “evidence for truth-revelation” in the upper-left corner. In interpersonal deception,
evidence for truth-revelation could correlate, e.g., in the amount of spatial detail in a
subject’s account of an event.
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Table 2: Attacker capabilities for degenerate cases of Gevidencehoney
Name of Region Description of Region Parameter Values
RWeak Game without evidence δ = 
ROmnipotent Complete information game  = 1, δ = 0
RConservative Evidence guarantees deception δ = 0
RAggressive No evidence guarantees truth-telling  = 1
RIntermediate No guarantees  6= 1 > δ 6= 0
6.1 Equilibria for RWeak
The equilibria for RWeak are given by our analysis of the game without
evidence (Ghoney) in Section 3. Recall that a separating equilibrium was
not sustainable, while pooling equilibria did exist. Also, the equilibrium
solutions fell into two different parameter regions. The sender’s utility was
discontinuous at the interface between parameter regions, creating an optimal
proportion of normal systems that could be included in a network while still
deterring attacks.
6.2 Equilibria for ROmnipotent
ForROmnipotent, the attacker knows with certainty the type of system (normal
or honeypot) that he is facing. If the evidence indicates that the system is
a normal system, then he attacks. If the evidence indicates that the system
is a honeypot, then he withdraws. The defender’s description is unable to
disguise the type of the system. Theorem 5 gives the equilibrium strategies
and utilities.
Theorem 5. Gevidencehoney , under adversary capabilities ROmnipotent supports the
following equilibria:
σS (m |n) ∈ ΓS (6.1)
σR (1 |n, e) =
{
n, e = 1
1− n, e = 0 , ∀n ∈ N, (6.2)
µR (1 |n, e) =
{
1− n, e = 1
n, e = 0
, ∀n ∈ N, (6.3)
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Table 3: Sample parameters which describe GSevidencehoney
Parameter Symbol Value
vo, sender utility from observing attack on honeypot 5
vg, sender utility from normal system surviving 1
−cC , sender cost for compromised normal system −10
−co − ca, cost due to attacker for attacking honeypot −22
0, utility for attacker for withdrawing from any system 0
va − ca, benefit of attacker for compromising normal system 15
with expected utilities given by
US (σS, σR) = p (0)
(
uS (1, 0)− uS (0, 1))+ uS (0, 1) , (6.4)
UR (σS, σR) = p (0)
(
uR (1, 0)− uR (0, 1))+ uR (0, 1) . (6.5)
Similarly to RWeak, in ROmnipotent the expected utilities for S and R
are the same regardless of the equilibrium strategy chosen (although the
equilibrium strategy profiles are not as interesting here because of the singular
role of evidence).
Next, we analyze the equilibria in the non-degenerate cases, RConservative,
RAggressive, and RIntermediate , by numerically solving for equilibria under
selected parameter settings.
6.3 Equilibria for RConservative , RAggressive, and RIntermediate
In Section 3, we found analytical solutions for the equilibria of a signaling
game in which the receiver does not have the capability to detect decep-
tion. In this section, we give results concerning signaling games in which the
receiver does have the capability to detect deception, using illustrative exam-
ples rather than an analytical solution. To study equilibria under the three
non-degenerate cases, we choose a set of parameters for the attacker and de-
fender utilities (Table 3). In this model (from [12]), the defender gains utility
from maintaining normal systems that are not attacked in the network, and
also from observing attacks on honeypots. The defender incurs a loss if a
normal system is attacked. The attacker, on the other hand, gains only from
attacking a normal system; he incurs losses if he attacks a honeypot.
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Table 4: Equilibria for Selected Parameter Values in RConservative ,
RAggressive, and RIntermediate , when the percentage of honeypots in a net-
work is high, medium, and low.
Saturation RWeak RIntermediate, RConservative, RAggressive ROmnipotent
Normal Yes Yes Yes
None Yes None Yes
Honeypot Yes Yes Yes
Based on these parameters, we can find the equilibrium utilities at each
terminal node of Fig. 6.1. We study examples in the attacker capability
regions of RConservative , RAggressive, and RIntermediate5. For each of these
attacker capabilities, we look for equilibria in pure strategies under three
different selected values for the percentage of normal systems (compared to
honeypots) that make up a network. For the high case, we set the ratio
of normal systems to total systems to be p (0) = 0.9. Denote this case
normal-saturated. For the medium case, we set p (0) = 0.6. Denote this case
non-saturated. Finally, label the low case, in which p (0) = 0.2, honeypot-
saturated. For comparison, we also include the equilibria under the same
game with no evidence emission (which corresponds to RWeak ), and the
equilibria under the same game with evidence that has a true-positive rate
of 1.0 and a false-positive rate of 0 (which corresponds to ROmnipotent ). In
Table 4, we list whether each parameter set yields pure strategy equilibria.
For adversary detection capabilities represented by RWeak , we have a
standard signaling game, and thus the well-known result that a (pooling)
equilibrium always exists. In ROmnipotent, the deception detection is fool-
proof, and thus the receiver knows the type with certainty. We are left with
a complete information game. Essentially, the type merely determines which
Stackelberg game the sender and receiver play. Because pure strategy equi-
libria always exist in Stackelberg games, ROmnipotent also always has pure-
strategy equilibria. The rather unintuitive result comes from RIntermediate,
RConservative, and RAggressive. In these ranges, the receiver’s ability to de-
tect deception falls somewhere between no capability (RWeak ) and perfect
capability (ROmnipotent ). Those regions exhibit pure-strategy equilibria, but
5The values of  and δ are constrained by Table 2. Where the values are not set by
the region, we choose them arbitrarily. Specifically, we choose for RWeak,  = 0, δ = 0;
for RIntermediate,  = 0.8, δ = 0.5; for RConservative,  = 0.8, δ = 0; for RAggressive,
 = 1, δ = 0.5, and for ROmnipotent,  = 1.0, δ = 0.
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the intermediate regions may not. Specifically, they appear to fail to support
pure-strategy equilibria when the ratio of honeypots within the network does
not fall close to either 1 or 0. In Section 7 on mechanism design, we will see
that this region plays an important role in the comparison of network defense
- and deceptive interactions in general - with and without the technology for
detecting deception.
7 Mechanism Design for Detecting or Leverag-
ing Deception
In this section, we discuss design considerations for a defender who is protect-
ing a network of computers using honeypots. In order to do this, we choose
a particular case study, and analyze how the network defender can best set
parameters to achieve his goals. We also discuss the scenario from the point
of view of the attacker. Specifically, we examine how the defender can set
the exogenous properties of the interaction in 1) the case in which honeypots
cannot be detected, and 2) the case in which the attacker has implemented
a method for detecting honeypots. Then, we discuss the difference between
these two situations.
7.1 Attacker Incapable of Honeypot Detection
First, consider the case in which the attacker does not have the ability to
detect honeypots, i.e. Ghoney. The parameters which determine the attacker
and defender utilities are set according to Table 3. The attacker’s utility as
a function of the fraction of normal systems in the network is given by the
red (circular) data points in Fig. 7.1. We can distinguish two parameter
regions. When the proportion of honeypots in the network is greater than
approximately 40%, (i.e. p (0) < 60%), the attacker is completely deterred.
Because of the high likelihood that he will encounter a honeypot if he at-
tacks, he chooses to withdraw from all systems. As the proportion of normal
systems increases after p (0) > 60%, he switches to attacking all systems. He
attacks regardless of the sender’s signal, because in the pooling equilibrium,
his signal does not convey any information about the type to the receiver.
In this domain, as the proportion of normal systems increases, the expected
utility of the attacker increases.
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For this case in which the attacker cannot detect honeypots, the defender’s
expected utility as a function of p (0) is given by the red (circular) data
points in Fig. 7.2. We have noted that, in the domain p (0) < 60%, the
attacker always withdraws. In this domain, it is actually beneficial for the
defender to have as close as possible to the transition density of 60% normal
systems, because he gains more utility from normal systems that are not
attacked than from honeypots that are not attacked. But if the defender
increases the proportion of normal systems beyond 60%, he incurs a sudden
drop in utility, because the attacker switches form never attacking to always
attacking. Thus, the if the defender has the capability to design his network
with any number of honeypots, he faces an optimization in which he wants
to have as close as possible to 40% of systems be normal 6.
7.2 Attacker Capable of Honeypot Detection
Consider now how the network defense is affected if the attacker gains some
ability to detect deception. This game takes the form of Gevidencehoney . Recall
that, in this form, a chance move has been added after the sender’s action.
The chance move determines whether the receiver observes evidence that the
sender is being deceptive. For Fig. 7.1 and Fig. 7.2, we have set the detection
rates at  = 0.8 and δ = 0.5. These fall within the attacker capability range
Rintermediate. Observing evidence does not guarantee deception; neither does
a lack of evidence guarantee truth-revelation.
In the blue (cross) data points in Fig. 7.1, we see that, at the extremes of
p (0), the utility of the attacker is unaffected by the ability to detect deception
according to probabilities  and δ. The low ranges of p (0), as described in
table 4, correspond to the honeypot-saturated region. In this region, honey-
pots predominate to such an extent that the attacker is completely deterred
from attacking. Note that, compared to the data points for the case without
deception detection, the minimum proportion of honeypots which incentives
the attacker to uniformly withdraw has increased. Thus, for instance, a p (0)
of approximately 0.50 incentivizes an attacker without deception detection
6At this limit, the defender’s utility has a jump, but the attacker’s does not. It costs
very little extra for the attacker to switch to always attacking as p (0) approaches the
transition density. Therefore, the defender should be wary of an “malicious” attacker who
might decide to incur a small extra utility cost in order to inflict a large utility cost on
the defender. A more complete analysis of this idea could be pursued with multiple types
of attackers.
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Figure 7.1: Expected utility for the attacker in games of Ghoney and Gevidencehoney
as a function of the fraction p (0) of normal systems in the network.
Figure 7.2: Expected utility for the defender in games of Ghoney and Gevidencehoney
as a function of the fraction p (0) of normal systems in the network.
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capabilities to withdraw from all systems, but does not incentivize an at-
tacker with deception detection capabilities to withdraw. At p (0) = 0.50,
the advent of honeypot-detection abilities causes the defender’s utility to
drop from 0.5 to approximately −2. At the other end of the p (0) axis, we
see that a high-enough p (0) causes the utilities to again be unaffected by the
ability to detect deception. This is because the proportion of normal systems
is so high that the receiver’s best strategy is to attack constantly (regardless
of whether he observes evidence for deception).
In the middle (non-saturated) region of p (0), the attacker’s strategy is no
longer to solely attack or solely withdraw. This causes the “cutting the cor-
ner” behavior of the attacker’s utility in Fig. 7.1. This conditional strategy
also induces the middle region for the defender’s utility in Fig. 7.2. Intu-
itively, we might expect that the attacker’s ability to detect deception could
only decrease the defender’s utility. But the middle (non-saturated) range of
p (0) shows that this is not the case. Indeed from approximately p (0) = 0.6
to p (0) = 0.7, the defender actually benefits from the attacker’s ability to
detect deception! The attacker, himself, always benefits from the ability to
detect deception. Thus, there is an interesting region of p (0) for which the
ability of the attacker to detect deception results in a mutual benefit.
Finally, we can examine the effect of evidence as it becomes more power-
ful in the green (triangle) points in Fig. 7.1 and Fig. 7.2. These equilibria
were obtained for  = 0.9 and δ = 0.3. This more powerful detection ca-
pability broadens the middle parameter domain in which the attacker bases
his strategy partly upon evidence. Indeed, in the omnipotent detector case,
the plots for both attacker and defender consist of straight lines from their
utilities at p (0) = 0 to their utilities at p (0) = 1. Because the attacker with
omnipotent detector is able to discern the type of the system completely, his
utility grows in proportion with the proportion of normal systems, which he
uniformly attacks. He withdraws uniformly from honeypots.
8 Related Work
Deception has become a critical research area, and several works have studied
problems similar to ours. Alcan et al. [13] discuss how to combine sensing
technologies within a network with game theory in order to design intrusion
detection systems. They study two models. The first is a cooperative game,
in which the contribution of different sensors towards detecting an intrusion
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determines the coalitions of sensors whose threat values will be used in com-
puting the threat level. In the second model, they include the attacker, who
determines which subsystems to attack. This model is a dynamic (imperfect)
information game, meaning that as moves place the game in various infor-
mation sets, players learn about the history of moves. Unlike our model, it
is a complete information game, meaning that both players know the utility
functions of the other player.
Farhang et al. study a multiple-period, information-asymmetric attacker-
defender game involving deception [14]. In their model, the sender type -
benign or malicious - is known only with an initial probability to the receiver,
and that probability is updated in a Bayesian manner during the course of
multiple interactions. In [15], Zhuang et al. study deception in multiple-
period signaling games, but their paper also involves resource-allocation. The
paper has interesting insights into the advantage to a defender of maintaining
secrecy. Similar to our work, they consider an example of defensive use of
deception. In both [14] and [15], however, players update beliefs only through
repeated interactions, whereas one of the players in our model incorporates
a mechanism for deception detection.
We have drawn most extensively from the work of Carroll and Grosu [12],
who study the strategic use of honeypots for network defense in a signaling
game. The parameters of our attacker and defender utilities come from [12],
and the basic structure of our signaling game is adapted from that work. In
[12], the type of a particular system is chosen randomly from the distribution
of normal systems and honeypots. Then the sender chooses how to describe
the system (as a normal system or as a honeypot), which may be truthful or
deceptive. For the receiver’s move, he may choose to attack, to withdraw,
or to condition his attack on testing the system. In this way, honeypot
detection is included in the model. Honeypot detection adds a cost to the
attacker regardless of whether the system being tested is a normal system or
a honeypot, but mitigates the cost of an attack being observed in the case
that the system is a honeypot. In our paper, we enrich the representation of
honeypot testing by making its effect on utility endogenous. We model the
outcome of this testing as an additional move by nature after the sender’s
move. This models detection as technique which may not always succeed, and
to which both the sender and receiver can adapt their equilibrium strategies.
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9 Discussion
In this paper, we have investigated the ways in which the outcomes of a strate-
gic, deceptive interaction are affected by the advent of deception-detecting
technology. We have studied this problem using a version of a signaling
game in which deception may be detected with some probability. We have
modeled the detection of deception as a chance move that occurs after the
sender selects a message based on the type that he observes. For the cases
in which evidence is trivial or omnipotent, we have given the analytical equi-
librium outcome, and for cases in which evidence has partial power, we have
presented numerical results. Throughout the paper, we have used the ex-
ample of honeypot implementation in network defense. In this context, the
technology of detecting honeypots has played the role of a malicious use of
anti-deception. This has served as a general example to show how equilib-
rium utilities and strategies can change in games involving deception when
the agent being deceived gains some detection ability.
Our first contribution is the model we have presented for signaling games
with deception detection. We also show how special cases of this model
cause the game to degenerate into a traditional signaling game or into a
complete information game. Our model is quite general, and could easily
be applied to strategic interactions in interpersonal deception such as border
control, international negotiation, advertising and sales, and suspect inter-
viewing. Our second contribution is the numerical demonstration showing
that pure-strategy equilibria are not supported under this model when the
distribution of types is in a middle range but are supported when the dis-
tribution is close to either extreme. Finally, we show that it is possible that
the ability of a receiver to detect deception could actually increase the util-
ity of a possibly-deceptive sender. These results have concrete implications
for network defense through honeypot deployment. More importantly, they
are also general enough to apply to the large and critical body of strategic
interactions that involve deception.
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